io.github.sudohnim/eidolon

Start a privacy-OSINT scan. Returns immediately with a scan_id. ``authorized_by`` (the operator) and ``reason`` (why this target is being scanned) are REQUIRED — a scan targets a real person, so every scan is attributable and written to an append-only audit log. Both must be non-empty. The scan runs in the background and takes several minutes. Poll scan_status(scan_id) until it reports "done", then call get_report(scan_id). Only one scan runs at a time. Provide at least one of email / phone / name (name works best with a city/state). Leaked credentials are never in the headline result — use reveal_credentials(scan_id) for those.

Start a batch of privacy-OSINT scans (SCALE.1). Returns immediately with a batch_id. ``authorized_by`` (operator) and ``reason`` are REQUIRED and cover the whole batch; each target's scan is audit-logged individually. Each target is a dict with keys email / phone / name / city / state / zip_code (at least one of email/phone/name; name needs a city/state/zip). Only one scan OR batch runs at a time — poll scan_status(batch_id) until it reports "done" (aggregate: total / done / report paths per child), then read each child with get_report(scan_id).

Check a scan or batch started by a scan_* tool: status is running | done | error. For a single target scan: when done, includes the headline result (risk, summary, top risks, report paths) and which sources were skipped because no API token was configured. For a batch id, aggregates child scans: total / done / error counts plus each child's scan_id and report path when done. Then call get_report(scan_id).

List previously run scans (newest first): scan_id, identifier, date, paths.

Return a scan's report. ``fmt`` is 'md' (default) or 'json'. The markdown is returned with the leaked-credentials section removed; call reveal_credentials(scan_id) to see those.

Return the leaked-credentials dossier for a scan (plaintext passwords). This is the explicit gate for the most sensitive output — only call it when the user has clearly asked to see the actual leaked credentials.

Return per-source provenance for a scan (EVIDENCE.3). Operator/audit surface: for each ran source, the tool version, vendor host, latency, the sha256 of the raw response (replayable), whether the request egressed via a proxy, and the source's status/reason. Optional ``source`` filters to one source name. Never contains the target's harvested data — provenance only.